Jul 11
23

Political Reform in China Part 2: Some Differing Viewpoints

China's political future?

(This is the second part of a series of posts on political reform in China. You can read part 1 here)

I’m currently looking at four articles that one way or another discuss the political system in China. The first one is a blog entry from the Economist entitled “What China challenges,” describing how China might succeed creating an affluent society under a one-party system, and the “risk” this supposedly poses to democratic systems. The next two are articles from the New York Times written by David Shambaugh and Minxin Pei, respectively, that take a glum view of the Chinese Communist Party on its 90-year celebrations. They are followed by an answer from Eric Li, challenging what he sees as too negative viewpoints on the subject matter. I will briefly discuss these in turn.

Let’s begin with “What China challenges.” The tone of the article is a worried one. Democracy isn’t the beacon that other nations are sailing towards. The China model is gaining traction and it is very probable that China might indeed one day be a fully developed state with very much the same system as it has today. It reads almost like existential worry from a person who feels his own country is failing the ideological race. But let’s just focus on his ideas about China for the moment: are they right?

Before reading on, I encourage everybody reading this entry to at least skim the mentioned articles, since I will mostly focus on the points I’m contending with in the individual pieces. Going on with the Economist blog entry: what sets China (and Vietnam) apart, according to the author, is the stable succession of their leaders. The economic principles are market-based, so the government policies are working far better than the Soviet Union ever did. The author then makes a comparison to Singapore, a successful country with an authoritarian system, and while he admits it might not be feasible to scale its example up to a country of China’s size, he looks at it the other way: at that size, Singapore should be democratic according to the best research we have. If they aren’t democratic, why would China be?

It seems the author’s arguments stop at the fact that China has a market economy and a stable succession scheme. I wouldn’t deny that the succession scheme is much more stable now than it was 30 years ago, but let’s not forget that the turmoil in 1989 was to a large extent caused by political infighting in the top leadership, and that was only about two decades ago. Hu Jintao made his transition after Jiang Zemin peacefully, but not without glitches; Jiang’s refusal to immediately step down as chairman of the Military Commission was one such thing that set a negative precedent. It might be that the infighting is now on a controllable level and while I’m sure the government has learned its lessons from more than 20 years ago, I’m not so sure there’s anything inherently peaceful about the structure itself.

Comparisons with Singapore are problematic on another level, as I allude to in a previous entry. Its system, while authoritarian, has the rule of law and is fundamentally built on a multi-party base. The PAP didn’t come to power through a revolution. It’s also worth noting that its founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, is still alive and very much active. Singapore will most likely change considerably after he leaves the scene. Still, it is no surprise that the CCP is studying the PAP closely and I think they’re right to do so; in his book about the China model, Zheng Yongnian points to PAP as an authoritarian yet much more open and transparent party than the CCP. If China’s future is indeed Singapore, like the author suggests, then it will still be very different from the China we know today.

David Shambaugh’s article on the CCP 90-year’s celebrations is slightly pessimistic, striking a different tone than his book published in 2008, “China’s Communist Party – Atrophy and Adaptation.” He mentions the celebrations and contemporary history writing in China and draws the conclusion that the party is insecure. In the book, Shambaugh seemed to be more confident that the CCP would continue to adapt, but lately he seems to have changed his mind and believes it has closed itself and is in for a bumpy ride. I’m personally not sure that the CCP is in for a bumpier ride than before; I believe the leadership transition next year is causing infighting to be more severe, and this combined with the 90-year celebrations, which in themselves might create tension, make it look rougher than it really is. Perhaps it’s really been atrophying more than adapting the last couple of years and I respect Shambaugh’s expertise in the area, but I will suspend my judgement on it for the time being.

Minxin Pei mostly goes along the same lines and describes insecurity and social forces that will make it more difficult for the CCP in the future. He describes the party as no longer having any public purpose once it shook off its communist ideology. I’m not so sure about that point; the CCP has always been part of a tradition to “rejuvenate China” (振兴中华) and it can still develop and use this part as its main ideology. Of course it’s not as clear as the Marxist ideals of its youth, but it’s still viable as an ideological force in Chinese society and I believe it will be for at least a decade ahead.

Eric Li challenges the points of Shambaugh and Pei, bringing up five misconceptions by the West as he sees it. I think Li’s piece is an interesting counterweight to the previous two authors and good for an international audience in that it shows a different perspective. Going through his five points, I find myself both agreeing and disagreeing. Let’s go through them in turn:

I agree that any government needs consent by the ruled to rule effectively, and I also agree that elections are not necessarily the best or only way to guarantee that. He’s also right that the CCP attracts a lot of talent from various parts of the country (though he only mentions university students). I do not, however, agree with his points on creativity. It would take a whole entry in itself to describe why, but numbers on companies and art auction revenues say very little about how innovative a country is as a whole. There isn’t something even remotely resembling Silicon Valley in China, for example, and it would be hard to find companies like Apple or Google that churn out a number of creative products each year. I don’t attribute this so much to the political system as the fact that China is still developing from a much lower level, but influences from the political system cannot be ruled out.

Li’s point about corruption is a fair one. Singapore is one of the least corrupt countries in the world but it’s dominated by one party. China is slightly ahead of India, which is a democracy. As I’ve said in my earlier post, I don’t believe governance in either China or India has much to do with its political system at this point. However, examples like Hong Kong and Singapore as China’s future ignore one important factor: these places both have independent watchdog organizations taking care of corruption. In China, there’s no organization outside the party or government that checks corruption. If China is to become like one of these areas, it has to change its system dramatically.

Finally, I agree that China’s success to date is due to more than just instituting market reforms. But the numbers used by Li do not take into account how the reforms in other countries were carried out and what level China started from. This is a complex state of affairs and also one that would require its own entry.

One thing I’m happy to note is that none of the articles mention the opinions of China’s “middle class” as proof of China being a different model than the rest of the world. I’ve seen this in many other places and my main answer to that is that China does not yet have a middle class in the sense that developed countries have; if 800 million are still living in the countryside with a corresponding standard of living, how could there be a sizable middle class (relative to the size of the population) that would influence its political development?

China’s future development is fraught with uncertainty (more so, I would say, than many other countries) and I believe many get their main premises wrong. In a coming post, I’m going to describe my own opinions on China’s political future.

This entry was posted on July 23, 2011 at 8:31 PM. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.

Posted in China Politics Singapore by Wukailong 29 Comments

S.K. Cheung says:

July 24, 2011 at 6:34 AM

Another nice post that summarizes the content at hand succinctly but also carries forward the narrative arc from Part 1. If Part 1 was the theory, and Part 2 is the current reality, then your part 3 will be the crystal ball segment. That part will take stones, so my props to you.

Singapore is the usual go-to comparison to try to show that authoritarianism is compatible with economic prosperity. But democracy is also compatible with economic prosperity. I don’t think they need to be mutually exclusive things. At the same time, is authoritarianism necessary for economic prosperity? Clearly not, since the alternative example exists. The inverse is also true. So to me, economic prosperity and system of governance are mutually independent, resulting in a 2X2 factorial number of possible combinations. In that case, even on the presumption of a general desire to achieve economic prosperity, it seems to me that the chosen mode of governance can be exactly that: chosen. This is the part that is sacrilegious in authoritarianism.

In addition, as you mentioned, there are many ways to view the scale argument linking Singapore and China. Whatever viewpoint/argument one espouses simply reflects one’s personal preferences. It is an argument conceived to support a preferred conclusion; it certainly is NOT an argument that can serve as a basis of proof of causality. For instance, whereas MS suggests that China couldn’t possibly be democratic unless a small island entity with economic prosperity becomes so first, one could similarly counter that as a nation progressively prospers, it is easier to maintain an authoritarian grip on a small geographically constrained populace than on a large populace spread over vast areas. Ultimately, I don’t think there needs to be a revival of cold-war metrics of communism vs capitalism. The latter has won out. It needn’t be the same dichotomy or competition between democracy and authoritarianism. It really comes down to preference, which in itself is a bit of an oxymoron since one doesn’t have the latitude to “prefer” authoritarianism; rather, it is simply foist upon you.

I share Shamburgh’s concerns. For all the lip-service that China has some democratic institutions and Wen’s recent European vacation, it seems that there is little appetite or tolerance for any semblance of same right now, as evidenced by the crackdown on dissidents and the further tightening of information controls. If there is a move afoot towards more “democracy”, they’re certainly starting off with recoil action first. Maybe China’s democratic progress is a spring-loaded mechanism. Or maybe it’s just all talk. Whether this is the ebb-and-flow leading up to a leadership transition, who knows. Maybe it’ll be 2 steps forward/1 back, and we’re just in the lull before the next 2 steps forward. We shall see.

I agree with Pei. What the CCP has to offer now has nothing to do with communism. It has everything to do with making good on Deng’s promise from 30 years ago. Lots of people are still awaiting their turn to get rich. If they don’t eventually, they might tire of waiting. That might pose problems for the CCP. If they do eventually, that might pose even more problems for the CCP, since they may run out of things to promise to their people. Maybe they will come up with something new to aim for. Or maybe people will simply choose to go in a different direction.

Li poses some interesting questions. It’s also noteworthy that he doesn’t really try to answer them, even though it’s clear as to which way he’s inclined. For instance, if there are other ways to validate consent and assess legitimacy besides elections, he doesn’t share them with us. And while the Pew surveys are nice, they are only part of the picture. It’s one thing to ask of “support”; but that is not the same as “preference”, or what one would select in the face of choices. Those choices are non-existent right now.

It’s true that power in the CCP is not based on nepotism. However, that does not dispense with the suggestion that said power is nonetheless concentrated and self-perpetuating. In fact, if that power didn’t have the potential to be self-perpetuating, we wouldn’t be having this discussion. He also speaks of merits, which is nothing new. There is nothing wrong with promotion based on merit; the issue is who gets to evaluate those merits. He’s suggesting that it’s wrong to argue against merits, except nobody is making that argument.

His points about restricted freedom of speech vs innovation is puzzling. What do successful artists have to do with innovation? And while scientific research papers are nice, they are also often there to pad a CV or justify a professorial existence. Innovation is more than getting some obscure project published in some obscure journal.

His point about corruption is the usual CCP apologist calling card. When the CCP is accused of being corrupt, he trots out comparisons. Those are true. Democracies can be corrupt too. But that doesn’t change the fact that the CCP has a bad case of it. Apparently, the CCP is less corrupt than some electoral democracies. Equally apparently, it is more corrupt than others. The bottom line is that the party itself pays lip-service to the fact that that needs to change. But as you point out, it dearly lacks the systematic mechanisms for doing so. The current CCP approach seems to be to single out the occasional bad apple and throw the book (or 2 books) at him. Consider the HSR exec or the China Mobile exec for recent examples. But if one believes that those are the 2 worst bad apples in the CCP pile, then there are probably bridges in Oregon that one should consider buying.

As for the relationship between China’s market economy and her recent 3-decades successes, it seems there is no debate that there is a causal relationship. The question is how much credit it deserves. The other question is how much of the remainder of credit should go to the CCP’s authoritarian system. Li asks “what else has China done?”. Well, for starters, she has the largest population in the world, and much bigger than the other market economy nations he listed as examples. Moreover, all of this is water under the bridge. Regardless of how much credit an authoritarian system deserves for getting China to this point in the context of a market economy, the real issue is how much it is required for China moving forward. This is where the crystal ball comes in. Probably no secret as to which way I’m inclined.

And just to add the cherry on top of the pile of ice cream sitting atop a chocolate cake, Li offers his “facts” as a rebuttal to other people’s “falsehoods”. When will CCP apologists learn that labeling their opinions as “facts” does not make them so?

Looking forward to part 3.

Steve says:

July 25, 2011 at 12:06 PM

Hi SKC~

I agree with your points to a large extent but not totally. Here are my points of difference…

Authoritarian governments tend to do very well when the economic rise occurs but they don’t have a good history of economic success once an economy becomes more mature because the bureaucracies tend to become more entrenched and have more influence than typical democracies. Because Singapore is so small, a party is able to exert control more completely than in a larger country and has been driven by the vision of one man. Once that man passes from the scene, we’ll be better able to judge their system of government.

I would also argue that a large amount of power in the CCP IS based on nepotism but not in the way most might think. On the federal level, the problem isn’t too bad. Though Xi Jinping might be the son of a prominent party member, he’s had to work his way up based on performance so on that level I agree with you. Mao’s grandson? From what I’ve read, he’s a general because he’s Mao’s grandson but that’s also an exception to the rule.

Where the problem exists on a much higher level is on the local level, in places most expats, tourists or overseas Chinese never see. CCP bosses in small towns keep power from generation to generation and sometimes exercise that power ruthlessly. This is where the cries of corruption are most felt, by the citizenry in small towns who see these powerful local families abuse the laws on an almost daily basis. I’ve heard many a story from my Chinese colleagues about happenings in their home towns and it’s one of many reasons why there is a flight to the cities. The long arm of the law isn’t quite that long.

The system can be very big on assigned quotas. If a certain bureaucrat in the education ministry decides that his department can take the credit for China having the most patent filings, he’ll assign quotas to different universities and by god, those patents will be filed regardless of whether the ideas are useful or not. The key is to hit the number.

This happened at the Shanghai Expo where they were determined to beat the record for most attendees at an Expo, held by Osaka which gave them yet another reason to beat the record as there is a certain amount of animosity held towards the Japanese. When the numbers weren’t high enough to do so, they simply bussed in enough people to hit the number.

We’re seeing the same thing happen currently with the movie “Beginning of the Great Revival” which, until it breaks the record for gross receipts, will be held in the theaters and keeping out the much anticipated final Harry Potter movie. As reported in this NY Times article:

“Before “Revival” earns a certain amount in ticket sales, for example, 800 million yuan (about $124 million), “other imported films will not be shown,” Gao Jun, a Chinese movie distributor, said at a news conference at the end of May, Southern Metropolis, a Chinese newspaper, reported.’

This is how authoritarian bureaucracies work, regardless of the country.

As with all systems of government, each has its strengths and weaknesses. I grow suspicious when a source recites one or the other but not both.

July 25, 2011 at 1:07 PM

To Steve:
that’s really the million dollar question, isn’t it? China under authoritarianism with free markets saw success. But assuming the status quo, will that arrangement continue to succeed? Who knows. However, I hope you’re not suggesting that China go from strong-party authoritarianism to strong-man authoritarianism…cuz she just emerged from the shadows of a version of that a few decades ago.

I agree that the situation at the national level is likely much different from that of the local level. Whether it be nepotism or corruption, the potential is much greater at the local level. And from a vantage point sitting overseas, or even with the occasional tourist visit to China, it is difficult to truly understand the locals’ experiences and frustrations.

Interesting anecdotes about the fascination of the CCP with numbers. But hey, if I had to sit through a complete snore-fest in order to earn a chance at watching Deathly Hollows Part 2, the cost-benefit analysis of that arrangement might still make it a worthwhile investment. I guess in our current fact-checking era, even the CCP can’t just claim the world record for Expo attendance or “patriotic” movie receipts; she actually needs to show someone the goods, even if they might be somewhat quasi-legitimate.

Rhan says:

July 25, 2011 at 3:09 PM

I know there are many that like to cite Singapore as successful model for an authoritarian system, me as well, however we must not forget that Singapore did hold election and many parties seek for the supports and votes from Singapore people in each and every elections, in fact Singaporean is required by law to vote. Hence SKC contention to let people to grade their government does exist in this city state though the unfair element pertaining to election and freedom of speech is much to be desired.

I think strong man politic can happen in both authoritarian and democracy, most politicians are well verse with the tactic to create fear and manipulate emotion, Singapore talk about surrounded by Muslim, Malaysia talk about Jewish (and race), and many quote the West and imperialism. Similarly the West talks about Islam, so in this context, I don’t see much difference between an authoritarian and democratic government except that progressive and discerning mind needs time to cultivate and most people from developed Western countries are well ahead in tem of education and perceptiveness.

Question is should CCP and PAP continue to strive for the best for their people and improve governance, and bring China and Singapore to be one of the wealthiest country in the world, would we still insist that the peoples longing for democracy is as strong as before? Actually my doubt toward how democracy and election can solve China problem is equally strong.

July 26, 2011 at 5:09 AM

To rhan:

Should the ccp continue to strive for betterment for her people? I would hope so.

Would I insist that people once prosperous still have a strong longing for democracy? Of course not. It is not for me to “insist” on how they would feel. But that doesn’t change my opinion that their preferences should not only be heard, but respected. It is those latter bits that are woefully lacking at his time.

Wukailong says:

July 26, 2011 at 2:54 PM

So many interesting comments in such a short time. I’d like to discuss the answers in more depth but too busy at the moment…

justrecently says:

July 27, 2011 at 3:21 PM

What is wrong with self-perpetuation through merits?
I think this line from Eric Li’s NYT article is gross. When analyzing the USSR’s politbureau, one may come to similar conclusions – so long as you are intelligent, astute, and highly conformist, you will make it to the top. Frankly, I think it is the business opportunities China offers, and a high degree of political opportunism which leads to conclusions like the one quoted above. And it’s hardly a secret that the CCP, umm, encourages this kind of opportunism among foreign investors, too.
I’m a member of a political party myself, but never seriously considered a political career. Our party bureaucracies, too, are featuring a lot of conformism, even if differing from one party to another. But then, party membership is hardly a prerequisite here to succeed in life. The CCP “attracts the brightest”, because the brightest need to cooperate with the powers that be.

Authoritarian governments tend to do very well when the economic rise occurs…
Probably true. You can’t fall out of the bed when you are sleeping on the floor. You can only stay there, or rise. The testing times are only beginning now, and the CCP certainly sees that – see the third stage description here. At the same time, as you apparently pointed out in your post, and as a number of central decisions plus Wu Bangguo’s latest work report would suggest, too, the party is re-emphasizing its old leninist ideologies again.

One more thing, I’m skeptical about the findings about Chinese optimism. Optimism is frequently a matter of behavior in China. You don’t sigh about the weather (as the British do, or so goes the cliche), you don’t mutter about “social injustices or your own health as the Germans do (or so goes the cliche), and to some extent (that plays a role which would be hard to measure), optimism is also partly a ritual. One Xinwen Lianbo news broadcast anyday might validate my point. I’m not so sure that every interviewee can define the interview as a situation different from any other talk with unfamiliar people.

July 27, 2011 at 3:26 PM

One essential nota bene: I can’t tell if Eric Li is opportunistic. He may genuinely believe what he writes. But I doubt that he sees the political dimension of what he writes. Cultures may be different – but different cultures don’t justify human rights violations. The rise through the ranks which he emphasizes goes hand in hand with abandoning independent ways of thought. The more you talk in a conformist way, the more your own talk will help to change your own conscience.

China Blogs Review / Phrasebook: Political Reform and Righteousness | Justrecently's Weblog says:

July 27, 2011 at 4:22 PM

[...] of a number of Chinese scholars’ views in short. After that first installment, he discussed another number of scholars’ and journalists’ views this month, from a more foreign persp…, plus some opinion of his own. Part three appears to be in the pipeline. Bremen-Hemelingen, July [...]

HongKonger says:

July 28, 2011 at 8:55 AM

Who are these two dimensional people the above poster is calling Chinese???? It’s as bad as some Mainlanders generalizing Americans as this and that from reading Chinese propaganda and are suckered by Hollywood self agrandizations. [Expletives deleted - admin]

July 28, 2011 at 10:59 AM

@ SKC: Does China really have free markets? It used to be SOE’s but then Deng opened it up to private entrepreneurs having connections with the local officials. That worked great but in recent years, funding to small companies has dried up while funding to huge, government owned corporations has skyrocketed. Thus, the smaller companies have had to borrow from relatives and expand more slowly than before, while the larger loans have gone to less profitable projects with many of those loans turning bad. The banks have lent more so those companies could maintain their payments (so the banks are paying back the banks with the bank’s own money) and it’s been estimated by some that this sum is close to one trillion dollars.

I don’t know how accurate that is since Chinese finances are opaque but the number is pretty high. This is called “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” but it worries me over the long haul. I’d like to see more of that money going to small, more innovative businesses since I believe China’s future success will depend on innovation.

Speaking of strong-man authoritarianism, this is where I think China and the CCP are owed a big compliment. It is not easy to go from a strong man such as Mao to the present system but they were able to do it, which is the first step into smooth transitions between governments. I feel the key figure was Deng, who had the foresight to line up the next two party chairman before he passed. Jiang held on to the Military Commission post beyond his term but was eventually ‘retired’. The upcoming transition also looks to be smooth, which is exceedingly important because Xi is the first leader not handpicked by Deng. Nice job in that regard and the first and most important step they needed to take in terms of modern political development.

July 28, 2011 at 11:07 AM

@ Rhan: You are correct, there can arise a ‘strong man’ in democracies but the phenomenon doesn’t usually last very long. After an initial acceptance, the opposing party gets the benefit of a push back, usually initiated by the media as resentment builds. Normal democratic politics tends to be swings back and forth from one side of the center to the other. One party pushes more freedoms, then the other party pushes more order, back and forth they go as each one tends to swing too far to one side and thus ensues an equal and opposite reaction.

The biggest problem with authoritarian systems is that this balance isn’t able to be achieved so if it swings too far to one side (Chavez, anyone?) there is no counterbalancing force to get it back to the center, almost like a ship that is listing to one side yet everyone is standing on that same side rather than moving to the other side of the ship so it can right itself.

Even with authoritarianism, Singapore has never swung so far to one side as to breed a violent reaction. That’s been the genius of Lee Kwan Yew. But you cannot judge an authoritarian system until you’ve gone through a few generations of leadership. Time will tell how Singapore turns out but it is much easier to control an island than a country, so I don’t see how anyone can compare Singapore with anyone else, even Malaysia.

Under Mahathir, Malaysia became a much more successful country but since he has stepped down from power, no one else seems to have the prestige to rule in an authoritarian manner and keep the consent of the people, at least from a distance. You’re there; what do you see? How have things changed since new leadership came into power after his retirement?

July 28, 2011 at 11:37 AM

@HongKonger: I get your point. Just cool it a little.

@JustRecently: Since this point was brought up, I’m also curious about it. Let me begin, though, by saying that I agree with your points about merits in an authoritarian system. When there’s only one game in town, and business opportunities are much easier to find when you work together with the ruling elite, that’s the organization the bright ones are bound to join. Part of this is like the PAP in Singapore, part of it is because of more mundane reasons because business and politics is so organically intertwined in China.

As for Chinese being optimistic as a ritual, that’s something that doesn’t really tally with my own observations here. Of course there’s a lot of that in the media and other official activities, but that’s not the same as what ordinary people think or do. I definitely haven’t seen ritualistic optimism among people when they’re worried about jobs or the housing market.

July 28, 2011 at 12:05 PM

Steve,

Will reply you later, meanwhile I provide here some link on LKY and Singapore.

http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/litee/world/article/kuan-yew-warns-of-two-party-system-pitfalls/

http://www.temasekreview.com/2011/07/27/lee-kuan-yew-singapore-will-spiral-downward-with-a-two-party-system/

SKC, would be interested to know you view on this.

July 28, 2011 at 12:25 PM

Rhan, thanks for the links. I’ve spent about three weeks total in Singapore so my expressed opinions aren’t necessarily my own but those of my local colleagues. Their biggest gripe wasn’t necessarily the one party system, it was their dislike of Lee Hsien Loong. They felt it was nepotism rather than competence. If his son hadn’t ‘inherited’ the presidency, the arguments in the links above would carry more weight but so far, it hasn’t been a ‘one party’ system as much as a ‘one family’ system.

The other comment I would make is that many times in history, very good leaders lose touch in their advanced years and becomes very conservative, spending most of their time defending what they had put into place, without having the ability to change with the times.

There might be a little of that here but again, I’d defer to someone who is actually from Singapore and sees what goes on day by day.

July 28, 2011 at 12:29 PM

Concerning Wukailong’s point, when I lived in Shanghai, I also couldn’t help but notice an individual pessimism among my friends, all of whom were highly educated and had excellent careers.

The pessimism wasn’t about China, it was an individual thing. It was as if they expected everything to go bad in their future, which I couldn’t understand for the life of me as these people were smart, hard-working and very personable, just the type you’d want to hire for a well-paying management position. I have no explanation for it but it was pretty evident, at least to me.

July 28, 2011 at 12:47 PM

@Steve: “It was as if they expected everything to go bad in their future”

A bit off-topic, but that sounds exactly like me! There’s this Chinese saying that I really like, 杞人忧天 (the man from Qi who fears the heavens), which originally described a person who was afraid that the heaven would fall down and the earth crumble under his feet. Now it describes someone who believes the worst things will happen. (In the original story, the fearful man speaks to someone who tells him the sky is not a thing that can fall, and the earth is the foundation of everything so it can’t crumble. The man then felt “great joy” and stopped worrying)

Honestly, I don’t really know why I think that way, so it might be the same thing with the people you met too!

July 28, 2011 at 1:04 PM

To Rhan:
thanks for the interesting articles. The subject is well beyond my scope. But Lee’s argument (“I am still here so the system must be working”) is a circular one. The system is rigged to ensure that he remains. The real question he needs to answer is whether he (and his faimly) are still there because he / they deserve(s) to be. And that should be a question for Singaporeans to decide. Based on the last election, it’s not as much of a slam dunk as it used to be.

Interesting that he acknowledges the desire of first world people to have a first world government. It becomes even more interesting if one day the people decide that such government is no longer what his family have on offer.

July 28, 2011 at 1:42 PM

As for Chinese being optimistic as a ritual, that’s something that doesn’t really tally with my own observations here.
Chinese people can be as pessimistic as anyone else, Wukailong, no doubt. I’ve seen a fair share of optimism and pessimism respectively, too. But I’m referring to the situation of an interview, such as the Pew surveys. Cheung mentioned one aspect in his first comment, but I believe there’s still another one. To be an interviewee comes closer to a Xinwen Lianbo situation than talking with people you see everyday: colleagues, friends, Chinese and (maybe) foreigners. The further you get into the hinterland, the more an interview situation will be felt to be a rather official, or extraordinary anyway, event.

July 28, 2011 at 1:59 PM

@justrecently: Oh, OK, then I understand what you’re getting at. That’s something I’ve been thinking about as well because the Pew surveys keep coming up, and I’ve so far only looked at a few of them. What I did notice, though, was that at least India and Brazil seemed to have higher levels of optimism than most developed countries. They weren’t as high as China though. My thought about that was that it’s similar to what many people in the Western world (and I would guess Japan too) felt when their countries were speeding ahead in the 1950 and 1960s.

So that, compared with a wish to answer in a more positive light, could explain the high Chinese numbers.

Another thing to pay attention to, also (and again, this is from personal observation and so more anecdotal) is that there was more optimism in the air when I came here in 2006 than it is now, with career and housing issues. The Tier 1 cities might be feeling this harder than the others because the problems arise here first.

jxie says:

August 19, 2011 at 1:23 PM

If you try hard enough, you actually can find plenty of the precedents of the modern Chinese political events in the 5000-year Chinese history (yes, including the legendary period).

Here is a monkey wrench into the whole discussion: just how stable are the major Western democracies in their most recent forms, i.e. post-universal suffrage, post-civil rights movement, and in their current welfare state? A large number of the Western democracies are already in such precarious debt levels, and worse yet with no end in sight. It’s almost inevitable Germany, the UK, France, Ireland will all join the distinguished club of Japan, Greece, Italy, Iceland, and the US, each with a gross national debt higher than 100% of their respective GDP — oh, don’t forget Zimbabwe is also a member. If the booming in China should just slow down a hair, you can pretty much add Canada to that list as well.

About optimism, a good question to ask Chinese around you is, do you see yourself better, worse, or about the same in 5 years?

August 19, 2011 at 10:26 PM

@Jxie: I’ll begin with your second paragraph. I don’t think there’s anything inherently stable with democracy; unless you institute appropriate social and economical reform you could easily fall into civil unrest and even war. Incidentally, the characteristics you mention (universal suffrage, civil rights and the welfare state) were all responses in various countries to social contradictions that might otherwise have had quite disastrous consequences. Now, the issue you think is destabilizing “Western democracies” (though you also mention Japan) is that of debt, and I can certainly see how that could be a big issue in the future. However, there are quite some differences between the Western countries. Where I grew up, Sweden, there never really was a civil rights movement and it’s been a welfare state since the 1930s. Its current debt level is currently a bit more than twice that of China in terms of GDP, which isn’t too bad. It’s not inherent in the system itself that it has to be fiscally irresponsible, just as authoritarian states do not have to have lower levels of debt. If you look at Singapore, for example, their debt levels in 2010 was at 102.4% which is higher than many European countries. When it comes to assessing a country’s general performance, I place very little belief in the superiority of a certain political system.

For reference purposes, here’s a list of debt per country:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_sovereign_states_by_public_debt

With regards to your first point, I don’t adhere to the line of thought that historical events can be used as a blueprint for how the future is going to unfold. Certainly you can find historical similarities to a lot of things (and you don’t even need to try hard) in any country or area of the world, but the way I see it is that the modern industrial societies are fundamentally different from dynastic or feudal ones. What looks like similar conflicts on the surface might just be that – surface similarities – and the problems facing any country with a mostly market-based economy today is basically the same on the same level of development. Now, I might have misunderstood you, so feel free to give some examples of what similarities you see with historical events.

As for optimism, I often play the devil’s advocate and try to cheer people up (and this is true wherever I am), but my general feeling is not that people think problems will be solved in 5 years and things in general better. A lot of the things I hear actually sound more to me like the late 1990s when people were talking about how much better it is abroad. I heard very little of that back in 2006 which in general felt like a more optimistic period. Your mileage might vary, but my guess is that people living in the most developed cities feel less optimism than those in poorer areas. The poorer areas have yet to experience the brunt of inflation and run-away real estate prices.

I would like to have ended this comment on a more positive note, but wherever I look in the world, I don’t see a reason for optimism, at least not in the short run.

August 20, 2011 at 11:13 PM

@Wukailong, w.r.t historical events. I don’t consider them to serve as a blueprint for the future, but rather a way to figure out what motivate and confine people in a civilization, which shape the future. Washington modeled himself after Cincinnatus, and subsequently he became a precedent to all future American presidents. It’s near impossible for Mao, or even Lee Tung Hui/Chen Shui Bian to model after Cincinnatus. During the Cultural Revolution, the intellects of the left-wing fashioned themselves as legalists (法家), against Confucians (儒家). This Legalism vs. Confucianism battle started some 2000 years ago, and had been mostly dormant since the fall of Qin. After Mao died and Deng took the power, a lot of official CCP news outlets for a while ran commentaries on the lesson of 李世民 accepting harsh criticism from 魏征, taking them in stride, and becoming a great emperor. The recent transfers of power in China are compared to 禅让, which started in the legendary pre-Xia period all the way to pre-Song, and then arguably re-emerged in the Chinese republic 兰芳共和国 in Southeast Asia lasted for some 100 years.

If we force the contemporary prisms of communism, socialism, capitalism, authoritarianism, democracy, etc. onto all contemporary political topics, my two cents are that we will miss a huge part of the overall picture.

Even in the modern-day fiat money system, a high national debt level with no visible future improvement will inevitably lead to massive default, hyper inflation, to even revolution. Sweden is a country with 9 million people that is much less diverse than larger Western democracies. More or less it has the “extended family” feel — if there is a crisis, Swedes are more genuinely in it together. Look at the US, with its gross national debt just breaching 100% of annual GDP with 10+% more projected each of the next several years, American politicians are still in this fantasy of “always [being] a triple-A nation”, and just kick the can down the road again and again. Actually my main point isn’t about how democracy will lead to higher level of debts (at least in larger and naturally less endowed countries), but rather in a discussion of how the future Chinese political system may turn out, we shouldn’t neglect the possibility of a total collapse among some of the major Western democracies in the foreseeable future.

My generation intellectually grew up in the TAM’89 era, yet many of my peers have gone through the last 2+ decades gradually agreeing more and more with CCP’s actions than disagreeing. On one hand, we have seen the rapid improvement of China with our own eyes; on the other, we also have seen the relative deterioration of many Western nations, which seemingly is speeding up. To me the latest Nobel Peace Prize winner isn’t so far ahead of his peers, but rather almost comically so far behind his peers. He is — how should I put this delicately? — if not for his speech impediment problem, a perfect main character for a TV show with him stuck in a time warp, a modern Don Quixote type of character.

Singapore’s high national debt actually is an accounting phenomenon. The bulk of its national debt (around US$200 billion) is to its own national pension system CPF. The nationstate of Singapore owns an investment firm Temasek, which is worth north of US$150 billion, and another $250 billion in foreign reserves. The fiscal health of Singapore is the best in the world except a few small oil-rich countries, e.g. Norway, UAE.

August 21, 2011 at 9:21 AM

If free market economies in the context of a democratic system of governance do result in “total collapse”, that may well be a logical reason for Chinese people to choose to hold onto their combination of free market economy and authoritarian governance.

August 21, 2011 at 12:56 PM

I think your eyes are widely open when it comes to the potential failure of Western countries, jxie, as you are no stakeholder there. It’s different with China. There you are a stakeholder, both in terms of national pride, and economically. The better you are off, the more you are going to fear the have-nots. That’s part of Chinese history, too. I don’t think that too many Egyptians “hated” Mubarak and his cronies about one year ago. Many may have felt a certain degree of unease, but that would be that. Only once the Tahrir Square was filling, a critical number of people – i. e. hundreds of thousands – became “aware” that they “hated” Mubarak. Mubarak’s main weakness was that he did indeed begin to appear weak – unresponsive first, and bustling later. It wouldn’t take much to make Chinese people – depending on where they stand in terms of income, social status, nationality etc. – believe that they “hate” their government, just as many of them “hate” the West today. To quite an extent, that’s a characteristic of an authoritarian system.

Democracy alone – I agree with Wukailong – doesn’t save a country. Sri Lanka is a democracy, but not the place to be, especially not if you are Tamil. But democracy doesn’t ruin a country either. Germany is a democracy, too, and it doesn’t look too bad – neither in terms of industrial competitiveness, nor in fiscal terms. It may even be in a position to contribute to the bailout of other European economies. The problem here is democracy indeed: people in my country are asking why they should make sacrifices to help coping with the aftermath of political decisions abroad, which were brought about by officials they never elected. “No taxation without representation”, in other words.

Democratically legitimate decisions can be as bad as decisions in authoritarian or totalitarian countries. But the good thing is that people in a democracy have to do some soul-searching of their own and can’t blame things squarely on officialdom.

August 21, 2011 at 4:05 PM

@jxie: Oh, now I understand better where you’re coming from. I have two thoughts on this matter. The first one is that historical events are usually understood in symbolical ways, and some of the examples you mentioned, apart from influencing how people think about issues, is also a justification for new policies or the current state of affairs. At least during the beginning of the reforms, Deng fought an uphill battle and had to use a number of methods to get people on his side, like using Li Shimin as an example. In the same way, I don’t see the Cultural Revolution as having much to do with Legalism or Confucianism, except on the surface, but they were used as justification. Whether they explain the motivations of the leaders of the day is another matter, but I can certainly see how they use strategies learned from ancient sources. As for 禅让制 I can once again see similarities to the modern situation, but they don’t seem to be much more than superficial to me. Others might disagree.

The second thought is the role I think historical factors do play in politics, on a non-individual level. Here I think ancient history doesn’t really play a role, but the national system for the last couple of centuries does, and in some cases politics of neighboring countries affect the outcome as well. The Soviet Union certainly took clues both from Bismarck’s Prussia and czarist Russia, and these continue to affect the outcome of Russian politics even today.

When it comes to China, pre-CCP politics should certainly be taken into account to find clues for the current situation, not just the Republic of China but also the way the Qing dynasty ruled. Why I don’t want to go much further back for causes is because the world changed so much around China during that dynasty; never before had China faced a situation of so belligerent and powerful outside forces (I don’t really count the Mongolians here).

I’ve also followed the rapid development of China up close, at least since 1997, and I too agree with many of the CCP’s policies (which is also what I’ve stated in other places). However, I sometimes get the feeling that many people outside China tend to have a more rosy picture of what’s going on and seem to think that it’s still just business as usual. Many people abroad say that China should just focus on economic development, but that’s not in line with analyses here that tend to stress social reforms. My viewpoints on political reform have changed over the last couple of years as I’m beginning to feel that the current system will constrict the development in the long run. I’m not alone in that assessment; books like 攻坚 support this basic premise, and I’m sure many within the party agree; without some sort of political reform, the economic development might suffer even in the near future. I also think reform is inevitable given the higher profile of social movements in the latter half of the last decade. At the end of the day, this is more about what I find likely, rather than any wishes on my part.

That many developed countries have huge problems in other areas don’t change that. To me, comparisons between the West and China don’t make much sense yet because of the difference in level of economic development. Many seem to think that China is powerful in every way because its economy is growing quickly and might surpass that of the US in a number of decades. But the way I see it is that China is currently still in a “raw growth” phase (though it’s also entering the next phase) and the real interesting question is how well it will fare when the growth slows down and social reforms get out of the embryonic state. The same, of course, goes for India.

Thanks for the description of Singapore, I didn’t know that. As for Sweden, it’s not as homogenous as people think; immigration has been brisk since the 1970s and the country today is diverse like many other European countries. Still, I can see how its relatively small size makes it easier to keep it together, but it’s also a product of culture and its past, which tended to value unity and conformity. Many aspects of American politics, for example, are unthinkable there.

August 21, 2011 at 4:13 PM

For a different take on political reform and a comparison with other socialist countries, I can recommend these two articles from 南方周末:

1. On Vietnam’s reforms

http://www.infzm.com/content/62317

2. What happened in the Soviet Union and what lessons can be drawn for China:

http://www.infzm.com/content/62345

August 21, 2011 at 7:00 PM

My impression from scanning the Nanfang article on the Soviet Union is that the author uses Stalin as an example for things that went wrong with the CPSU, and Lenin as an ideal example of how centralism and democracy (apparently “inner-party democracy” rather than “democracy” beyond the party) would have been combined, if only Lenin had outlasted Stalin. It also seems to seems to shield its arguments from the real world, i. e. China’s actual economic – or state-capitalist – environment. Am I getting the gist of the article right so far, Wukailong?

The author comes across as a believing communist, and that looks confusing to me.

August 21, 2011 at 9:31 PM

I think Huang’s main point is that the problems that have faced governments ruled by communist parties is of a systemic rather than personal nature. He does point Lenin in a very good light and Stalin in a bad one, but what it finally boils down to (at least from my understanding) is that this happened because there were no checks and balances within the party. That’s the reason for some of the mentions of the Eastern European leaders (Hoxha, Tito, etc). Of course, the conclusion has very little in terms of what needs to be done exactly to achieve the aim of more socialist democracy, getting closer to the masses and all the other points.

Pacific Rim Shots
Musings on politics, culture and society

Political Reform in China Part 2: Some Differing Viewpoints

29 Responses to "Political Reform in China Part 2: Some Differing Viewpoints"

Leave a Comment

Clustrmaps

Who's Online

Recent Posts

Recent Comments

Categories

Blogroll

Archives

Meta